Argentina: Countering the fly goalkeeper with an aggressive press

A key factor in this quarter-final was the attacking threat posed by Higuita. For over a decade, Kazakhstan’s goalkeeper has been one of futsal’s best players, demonstrating world-class abilities both in and out of possession. Higuita’s influence on his team’s play with the ball is profound, and was on show throughout Kazakhstan’s run to the last eight of the FIFA Futsal World Cup Uzbekistan 2024™. For Argentina to advance, they needed to overcome a team who’s playing style heavily relies on their star keeper. In the following article, the Technical Study Group’s Graeme Dell explains how Argentina were able to negate the threat of Higuita using an aggressive press, and reveals how this plan consequently provided the basis for some of La Albiceleste’s own attacking threat.

With the technical capabilities of an outfield player, Higuita has reshaped the boundaries of what was previously deemed possible for his role. As Dell explains:

“Higuita is a role model for aspiring futsal goalkeepers. The thing about him is that he has the confidence and ability to pass the ball on the ground. In futsal, we’ve recognised from the data collection that the goalkeeper plays an increasingly important role in the set-up of attacking play. Higuita exemplifies a rounded goalkeeper that’s not just a shot-stopper, but a creator and his influence on the modern goalkeeper is profound.

“He’s done it with such confidence for such a long time – so much so that he’s been an example for national coaches and club coaches to say, ‘Hey look, we need a more rounded goalkeeper in our team because they’re important to what we do’. You can see, when looking at many of the younger goalkeepers coming through this tournament, that they now are from the same mould as Higuita, but still require some technical development to reach his level. In this sense, he has created a legacy in futsal.”

Higuita’s mastery of the ball allows him to be the main protagonist in his team’s build-up play, receiving the ball and passing it on with ease and precise technical execution. Tactically, Higuita comes into his own as a fly goalkeeper. Goalkeepers of the past would not typically feature in a team’s attacking play to the extent Higuita does – their skill set would not allow it. With Higuita on the court, Kazakhstan have five players with the technical capabilities to string intricate passing patterns together and shoot from range, which increases their threat. The relationship of technical capability with tactical deployment is important to their game plan. Clip 1 below demonstrates this, with Higuita acting as the focal point for his team’s attacking play leading up to a goal against New Zealand.

During the powerplay phase, teams replace their keeper with an outfield player, with the idea that the outfield player can momentarily help contribute to sustaining an attack with their advanced technical capabilities. This is by contrast to the utilisation of the fly goalkeeper where they play in an advanced position, effectively seeking to achieve the same outcome as a powerplay. With a keeper that is both technically proficient and capable of fulfilling his shot-stopping obligations, Kazakhstan are not forced into the powerplay which in itself brings risk; statistics are showing teams are more likely to concede a goal than score with the powerplay unless that mix of technical and tactical understanding are collaborated.

FIFA’s performance data supports the observation that Kazakhstan’s keeper is heavily involved in their in-possession play. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan currently rank first for the highest average of fly goalkeeper instances, with an average of 24 instances per game. Higuita also averaged 39 possessions per game prior to Kazakhstan’s quarter-final, which is the highest of all goalkeepers at the tournament to date.

How did Argentina overcome such a threat? In the quarter-final, the South American side executed a relentless press which denied the Asian participants the opportunity to set up in Argentina’s half and prohibited Higuita from pulling the strings. Up until their quarter-final with Argentina, Kazakhstan and Higuita were free to play in this area, averaging 26 flying goalkeeper instances per game. In their tie with La Albiceleste, they recorded just 16, a 40 % decrease that indicates the success Argentina found in negating Kazakhstan and Higuita’s in-possession performance. Higuita himself also only managed 29 possessions, 29% less than his game average of 39 leading up to the quarter-final.

Dell explains Argentina’s pressing system in detail below:

“Argentina were aggressive from the off. They played in an undulating 1-3 formation when out of possession and transitioned from a mid-block into a high press with speed and effectiveness, which stopped Higuita from playing out. When you’re pressing in a 1-3, there has to always be a player pushing on to shut the first ball down. Then, there will always be a trigger in the opponents play, such as a pass or a movement, for the two other players, usually another winger and forward player, to go and press the immediate passing lines. The remaining player, the defender, has to prevent the passing line into the forward player or pivot.”

Other than adherence to a pressing trigger, fully maintaining the press was a standout feature. “They didn’t go and press the ball and then stand off and let the Kazak player pass the ball,” Dell points out. “They kept pressing and forced the ball, getting in contact with the Kazakh ball carrier and tried to make the tackle.” This point is clear to see in Clip 2 below. The press and the effort to affect the press is worthless unless the ball is threatened and it is here that the talented passing teams are best pressured.

Argentina’s decision to press aggressively without the ball characterised several of their key moments in possession as well, with two of their six goals being direct consequences of this defensive approach. The success Argentina found once turning over possession was a testament of their ability to retain the ball, explains Dell:

“When you win the ball back through a press, the priority is to keep possession and recycle it to create a clear goalscoring opportunity. Often, when teams win the ball back in zone 4, they are too eager to get a shot away and squander the chance. When Argentina turned over possession, especially in the second half, they were happy to either pass the ball back and restart a new attacking phase or play a follow-up pass to a team-mate in a better position to score.”

Clip 3 below shows how closely Argentina’s defensive strategy intertwined with the nature of their attacks. In their 1-3 formation, all four of Argentina’s outfield players press a different player, cancelling any possible passing line for Kazakhstan and confining Higuita to his penalty area. Bolo Alemany (4), Angel Claudino (3) and Cristian Borruto (9), who form the front three of the Argentine press, prevent any form of Kazakhstan progression and push their opposition back into their own half. Eventually, the front three force the error and capitalise, scoring their second goal of the game.

A similar situation arises in Clip 4, where Argentina’s Cristian Borruto (9) and Pablo Taborda (14) lead the press against Kazakhstan, pushing them deep inside their own half. Borruto’s persistence eventually forces a loose ball. Now in possession, Kevin Arrieta (13) can combine with Borruto, shoot and win the penalty that leads to the 6-1. Once again, this shows the fine line between La Albiceleste’s defensive and attacking approach.

• The concept of the press is to regain possession by pushing the opponent back and forcing a possession error. It is important to remember this and avoid falling into the trap of half-hearted pressing, which can be detrimental and allows the pass to be played and exploit space left by the press. 

• Countering a potent attacking threat demands a bold and aggressive defensive strategy. In this match, Argentina highlighted Kazakhstan’s strength in possession and executed their tenacious press to negate it.

• A vulnerability can be turned into an advantage. The defensive plan devised by Argentina – to press and prevent Kazakhstan and Higuita from meaningful possession in the attacking half – ended up also as a means for the South American team to score goals.