Understanding FIFA Futsal World Cup 2024 in five key observations

FIFA Futsal World Cup Uzbekistan 2024™ was the second Futsal World Cup where FIFA used its bespoke data-collection process to better understand how the game is played at the highest level. Having now collected this unique data at two futsal competitions, using identical parameters it is possible to compare match and tournament-level statistics from one FIFA Futsal World Cup with another. The Technical Study Group (TSG), with the help of FIFA’s Performance Insights team, singled out five observations indicating shifts in the way futsal was played in Uzbekistan when compared to FIFA Futsal World Cup Lithuania 2021™ and provided their insight into why these changes are taking place. The observations cover the following topics:

• Amount of goals scored and conversion rates

• Fly goalkeepers and powerplays

• Time spent in high and mid-blocks

• Attacking-phase goals and first-touch finishes

• Set plays and game state

In FIFA Futsal World Cup 2021 there were a total of 4,138 attempts on target. The 2024 edition witnessed 4,215, signalling a marginal 1.9% increase in the number of attempts on goal. Coupling this small increase with the substantial 20.7% rise in total goals scored suggests finishing in Uzbekistan improved to some extent. Looking at the top three teams for converting attempts also supports the claim that participants are, on average, more clinical than in 2021. The most effective finishers in Uzbekistan were Panama, Thailand and Brazil, who converted 12.8%, 12.5% and 12.3% of their total attempts, respectively. In Lithuania, the top three were Uzbekistan, Iran and Argentina, who managed rates of 10.5%, 9.6% and 9.0%.

Despite improvement in conversion rates, the TSG stresses that finishing is still one area for future development. The rate of attempts on target in Uzbekistan sits at 35.4%, which is a minor increase from Lithuania’s 35.3% and indicates that a substantial majority of shots still do not register on goal.  

Two of futsal’s most unique features are the fly goalkeeper and powerplay. During a powerplay, a team can replace its goalkeeper with an outfield player who adopts a more advanced position to help sustain an attack. FIFA defines a fly goalkeeper as when the goalkeeper themselves adopts this advanced position, moving inside the opposition’s half where they are not subject to any time restrictions. This achieves the same outcome as the powerplay without making a substitution and ceding a goalkeeper’s unique defensive capabilities.

Fly goalkeeper

A striking difference between the 2024 and 2021 tournaments is the increased popularity of the fly goalkeeper as a method of play. The number of times teams deployed this strategic move increased by 74.5%. The TSG note the increase is likely due to teams’ improved understanding that a goalkeeper contributing to attacks can help achieve several in-possession objectives without sacrificing goalkeeping expertise, as done in the powerplay. These objectives are:

• breaking, beating, or pushing back the opposition’s press;

• creating numerical advantages;

• maintaining player presence in the 5 without substitution risk;

• starting and developing offensive transitions; and

• reinforcing attacking set-play situations.

There is evidence to suggest that this ploy is reaping attacking returns. Teams found the net in 5.9% of fly goalkeeper incidents, far more than in 2021, where only 1% of these situations resulted in a goal. Overall, the TSG noted that the fly goalkeeper’s increased use and attacking threat is down to more keepers possessing the technical capabilities to contribute meaningfully to their team’s in-possession play.

Powerplay
The overall increased attacking threat seen with the fly goalkeeper was not present when analysing the effectiveness of powerplays. Although the number of powerplays increased by 38.1%, the rate of goals scored during these situations actually shrunk from 7.6% in 2021 to 4.2% in 2024. Participants also conceded in 6.5% of powerplays. Despite this rate decreasing slightly from 2021’s 7.6%, it still implies teams are more likely to concede than score during these moments.

Key questions raised by the TSG in regards to these powerplay statistics are:

• Why are teams deploying powerplays if they are not effective?

• What are teams’ intentions when they are deploying them?

• Do teams understand why their use of the powerplay is failing?  

The TSG do note however that there are signs that teams are changing the way they deploy powerplays. The instances where teams used a powerplay when the scoreline is equal has decreased by more than half (3.3% down from 7.2%). This could show a development in teams’ thinking of which game states best suit this strategic ploy.

Where on the pitch teams make their attempts from during powerplays also demonstrates a degree of progress, with more being made in Zone 4 (28.5% versus 2021’s 20.5%) and Zone 3 (18.4% versus 2021’s 16.3%).  This change shows teams are opting to circulate and progress the ball closer to the opposition’s goal instead of shooting from distance. Nevertheless, considering that teams are currently statistically more likely to concede than score when opting for the powerplay – and also considering teams in Uzbekistan scored fewer powerplay goals than in 2021 – it is clear that there is still significant room for improvement. With more advanced positioning, the risk is clearly higher versus the reward that is being gained as evidenced by the data. 

FIFA’s phases of play metrics identify where on the pitch teams are playing their futsal. Six of the key phases a team can operate in when out of possession are the low block, low press, mid-block, mid-press, high block and high press. Comparing the time teams spent in these six phases in the 2024 tournament compared to 2021 reveals significant shifts in how teams are operating without the ball:

• The time teams spent in high block/press phases reduced by 40.4%.

• The time in mid-block/press also reduced by 9.5%.

• The time teams spent in low block/press increased by 15.2%.

The TSG see these three changes as interconnected: when teams struggle to deploy a high or mid-block, they fail to put meaningful pressure on the player with the ball. This affords the opposition time and space to break the press and progress play. An alternative measure for defending teams is to adopt the more compact, risk-averse low block.

The 74.5% increase in the use of the fly goalkeeper discussed in Observation 2 is another potential contributor to the reduction in time spent in the high block and press. In possession, technically and tactically astute goalkeepers are contributing to attacks that pin their opposition back and make it more difficult for defensive lines to advance and press.

Measuring block and press aggression through defensive events

The statistics on how aggressive teams were during these phases, measured by number of seconds per defensive event, sheds more light on how performances have shifted. The average number of seconds per defensive event made by teams in the low block and low press phases did not change from 2021 (22.8 seconds). In contrast, the number of seconds per defensive event for teams in mid-block and mid-press increased by 3.8 seconds (24.9 seconds up from 21.1 in 2021), indicating that teams in Uzbekistan, on average, were less aggressive during mid-block phases.

Like the mid-block and mid-press phases, teams in the high-block and high-press phases also produced fewer defensive events on average than in 2021 (22.2 in Uzbekistan versus 19.4 in Lithuania). The TSG notes that if teams are going to press high, they need to be effective and understand how to deploy these defensive systems. 

The success teams found during the attacking phase was another central observation in Uzbekistan. FIFA determine a team to be in an attacking phase if they i.) cross over into the opposition’s half with the ball, either by passing it or  running it over the halfway line and ii.) proceed to pass the ball to a team-mate in the attacking half at least once. Any subsequent passage of play by the attacking team in the opposition’s half is deemed to be part of an attacking phase.

20.6% of all goals scored in Lithuania were during these phases, whereas the same type of goals accounted for 30.9% of goals scored in the 2024 edition. The increase in the portion of attacking-phase goals is closely connected to Observation 3 above. With low blocks being a more common defensive structure, it is easier for an attacking team to progress and circulate the ball into Zone 3 than when facing high or mid-blocks. The increase in goals scored in the attacking phase is a reflection of this type of game situation where the attacking team is circulating possession in Zone 3, probing for an opening in Zone 4 to score.

Another intriguing difference between the 2021 and 2024 tournaments is regarding first-touch finishes during open play. The share of total goals scored with the initial contact increased from 32.9% in 2021 to 40.9% in 2024. These types of finishes proved especially popular during attacking phases in Uzbekistan, with 30.3% of the tournament’s first-touch finishes coming during these periods of the game, substantially more than the 20.1% registered in Lithuania. This indicates that players were executing deliveries more precisely, and their team-mates positioned themselves better to convert chances.

One of the main observations from the TSG regarding set plays was the number of goals scored in these moments altering the game state. In other words, the TSG were finding that more goals from dead-ball situations were shifting a team’s standing in a match from losing-to-drawing or drawing-to-winning positions. The decisiveness of set-play goals was also reflected in the data. Half of set-play goals (50.7%) changed the game state in 2024, a ten per cent increase from 2021 (41.0%). This represented a clear shift in application and understanding of the potential game-changing impact of well executed set-plays.

An additional finding was that during the 2024 tournament a decreased proportion of total goals scored stemmed from attacking-corner, freekick and kick-in phases. Goals scored in these situations accounted for 100 of the 301 goals scored (33.2%) in Lithuania, whereas these phases were responsible for only 81 of the 362 goals (22.4%) in Uzbekistan. This overall decrease reiterates the TSG’s observation on set-play decisiveness: although there were fewer goals scored from these situations in 2024, the ones that were scored were more likely to leave their mark on the game’s outcome, suggesting teams were able to use dead-ball situations to their advantage during key moments in the game.